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Segregation Under the Guise of the Fair
Housing Act: Affirmatively Furthering




Segregation is alive and well in the United States.1 And
while overt discrimination still exists, even well-intentioned
programs can serve antithetical purposes if left unmonitored-a
segregative use of the Fair Housing Act illuminates this reality.
Facially neutral laws can be discriminatorily applied,3
underpinned with discriminatory purposes,4 or have a racially
discriminatory effect. Akin to a wolf in sheep's clothing, a
discriminatory effect can mask itself in anti-discriminatory,
integrative legislation.
On its face, the Fair Housing Act ("Act" or "FHA"), Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, explicitly contains negative, anti-
T. J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2015. First and
foremost, many thanks to both Myron Orfield and the Institute on Metropolitan
Opportunity for the guidance. Additional thanks to the editors and staff, both past
and present, of Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice. Any
shortcomings and oversights are my own.
1. See Cowan v. Cleveland Sch. Dist., 748 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2014) ("A
freedom of choice plan is not necessarily an unreasonable remedy for eliminating
the vestiges of state-sponsored segregation, but it has historically proven to be an
ineffective desegregation tool.").
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
4. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
5. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating that mere
racially discriminatory impact is not enough to show that the law is a race
classification that gets strict scrutiny; rather, some showing of racially
discriminatory purpose is also required to show that the law is a race
classification-but disproportionate impact is not irrelevant to complainant's equal
protection argument); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights. v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (holding that circumstantial evidence can be used to show
discriminatory purpose; that proof that the law was motivated in part by a
rationally discriminatory purpose would not automatically require the law's
invalidation; and that in these circumstances, the burden shifts and defendant
carries the burden of establishing that the same decision would have been made
even if the impermissible purpose had not been considered).
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discrimination obligations. However, the FHA also contains
positive obligations.7  Therefore, the FHA not only prohibits
discrimination, but participants must also take steps to overcome
patterns of segregation through integrative measures.8 Central to
this Note is the latter, affirmative obligation.
The Fair Housing Act contains the positive obligation to
create "integrated and balanced living patterns."'  To fulfill the
obligation to build integrative developments, participants
frequently use the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program
("LIHTC"), a federal subsidy that incentivizes the private market
to invest in low-income housing.0  Furthermore, LIHTC
participants must explain their LIHTC distributions by developing
a Qualified Allocation Plan ("QAP")." Based on how and where
QAP awards points, participants can target which developers
receive LIHTC funding to build housing projects with affordable
12rents.
Despite the FHA's integrative and affordable purposes,
housing authorities can use the LIHTC program to site
developments in a segregative manner-these units offer
affordable rents to prospective tenants, but can cost more money
development-wise than integrative placements. 3 This Note uses
the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area as an example case, although
unfortunately, the area is not an anomaly. 4 Minneapolis and St.
6. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
7. A negative obligation does not require the individual to do anything beyond
not participating in the prohibited act-in other words, passively refrain from the
named action. In contrast, a positive obligation requires affirmative, proactive
steps by the individual or entity. See, e.g., Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 457 (D. Md. 2005) ("It has been judicially
recognized that Section 3608 prescribes an affirmative duty . . . 'something more
than simply refrain from discriminating (and from purposely aiding discrimination
by others.)') (citing NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st
Cir. 1987)).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2012).
9. NAACP, 817 F.2d at 156; see 114 CONG. REC. 2276-707 (1968); see also
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (referencing comments
by FHA co-sponsor Senator Walter F. Mondale, who stated that the FHA "aimed to
replace the ghettos by truly integrated and balanced living patterns").
10. I.R.C. § 42 (2012); see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §
252, 100 Stat. 2085, 2189.
11. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 462A.222 subd. 3 (2013).
12. Id.
13. James A. Long, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit in New Jersey: New
Opportunities to Deconcentrate Poverty Through the Duty to Affirmatively Further
Fair Housing, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 75, 77 (2010).
14. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs (Inclusive Cmtys. H), 860 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D. Tex. 2012); see also Long,
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Paul, the central cities of the area, utilize and continue to refine a
QAP that is neither integrative nor cost-effective.15  Instead of
fulfilling its FHA obligations, the current Twin Cities QAP awards
points to segregative areas by the very nature of its scoring
system." This program serves not as a means to further fair
housing, but rather favors expensive placements in segregated
areas or communities in danger of re-segregating."17 Because the
FHA is about community-wide, long-term integration, affordability
need not be limited to affordable rents; it can also extend to overall
development costs.18 Expensive community development projects,
absent integration, are impermissible under the FHA.1"
Section II begins by discussing the development of the Fair
Housing Act, the LIHTC and QAP programs, and the FHA's
proposed Affirmatively Furthering Rule. 2' Next, Section III uses
the Twin Cities to demonstrate the problematic nature of an
improperly drafted QAP-an issue that permeates America's
metropolitan regions. Section III adds to preexisting discussions
of segregative QAPs, but introduces a cost-based analysis to the
argument for integrative placements. 21 This Section concludes by
proposing that the Twin Cities redraft the QAP to properly fulfill
FHA obligations, specifically by examining its own errors and
lessons from other jurisdictions.
The purpose of this Note is three-fold: (1) to explain how a
poorly-drafted QAP can disguise segregative development; (2) to
demonstrate that expensive units focused on community
improvement rather than integration violate FHA obligations; and
(3) to aid in drafting a QAP that reflects the obligation to create
balanced and integrated living patterns. The Twin Cities use a
non-integrative and costly QAP . In order to fulfill obligations
supra note, 13 at 83-84 (noting that some regions, including the Newark
metropolitan area, locate most of their allocated LIHTC in high poverty areas).
15. See Minneapolis/Saint Paul Housing Finance Board, Minneapolis/Saint
Paul Housing Finance Board Low Income Housing Tax Credit Qualified Allocation
Plan (2014), http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@cped/documents
/webcontent/wcmslp-108463.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
16. Id.
17. See Self-Scoring Worksheet, 2013 Housing Tax Credit Program, MINN.
Hous. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.mnhousing.gov/idc/groups/multifamily/%20.%20.%
20.%20/mhfa_012480.rtf (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
18. See infra discussion pp. 310-315.
19. Id.
20. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg. 139, 43710-43
(proposed July 19, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, &
903) [hereinafter AFFH].
21. See infra Part III.
22. See Self-Scoring Worksheet, 2013 Housing Tax Credit Program, supra note
2015]
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under the FHA, Minneapolis and St. Paul-and other
communities-must redraft their current QAP. Affordable
housing developments, made possible under the FHA, become
neither fair nor affordable when left unmonitored for FHA
violations-the FHA requires non-discrimination and integration,
not expensive community development.23
II. Background: The Development of Integrative
Affordable Housing
The Civil Rights Movement bred numerous tools intended for
integrative development. 24  Before addressing their abuses and
pitfalls in Section III, this Note begins by chronologically
addressing these tools' backgrounds and developments. First,
Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act to combat discriminatory
housing practices against minority groups; throughout the years,
case law has refined the FHA's negative and positive obligations.
Second, in an effort to implement the Act, the LIHTC and the QAP
coexist to site affordable housing developments in particular,
potentially suspect, communities. Finally, a rule proposed in July
of 2014-Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing ("AFFH")-
attempts to implement the FHA more effectively.
A. History, Obligations, and Developments of the Fair
Housing Act and HUD Regulations
Four years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968.21
In an effort to combat increased patterns of housing segregation,
the latter piece of legislation included Title VIII, more commonly
known as the Fair Housing Act.2 ' Before the FHA's passage,
Congress considered a fair housing bill but struggled to pass such
17; see also Minneapolis/Saint Paul Housing Finance Board, MinneapolislSaint
Paul Housing Finance Board Low Income Housing Tax Credit Qualified Allocation
Plan (2014), http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@cped/documents/
webcontentlwcmslp-108463.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Twin Cities
QAP].
23. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2012).
24. Wendell E. Pritchett, Where Shall We Live? Class and the Limitations of
Fair Housing Law, 35 URB. LAW. 399, 402 (2003) (noting activist accomplishments
in "the New York State Committee on Discrimination in Housing and the National
Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, were important institutions that
provided models for the emerging civil rights movement").
25. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1968 Civil Rights Act].
26. Fair Housing Act of 1968 § 804, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602-19 (2012).
[Vol. 33: 285
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legislation.27 In 1968, President Johnson used the emotional
momentum from Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s April assassination
to catalyze the bill's passage . President Johnson signed the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 into law only a week after King's death.
Through the FHA, Congress introduced federal enforcement
mechanisms against discriminatory housing practices, stating, "It
is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."3
Since 1968, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
possesses the authority to administer the FHA,31 and "[aill
executive departments and agencies shall administer their
programs and activities relating to housing and urban
development.., in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes
of this subchapter and shall cooperate with the Secretary to
further such purposes.3 2  These purposes include the FHA's
negative and positive obligations.
1. Obligations Not to Discriminate Under the Fair
Housing Act
Unless a development meets one of the FHA's exemptions,
the FHA forbids discriminatory housing practices. 4  These
27. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 4048 (1968); 114 CONG. REC. 3805 (1968); 114
CONG. REC. 3421 (1968).
28. History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP'T OF HOuS. & URBAN DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program-offices/fair housing-equal_
opp/aboutfheo/history (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter History of Fair
Housing].
29. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
31. Id. § 3608(a).
32. Id. § 3608(d).
33. Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 456-
59 (D. Md. 2005).
34. However, the FHA's prohibitions apply to sale or rental of certain
dwellings:
(A) dwellings owned or operated by the Federal Government; (B) dwellings
provided in whole or in part with the aid of loans, advances, grants, or
contributions made by the Federal Government, [subject to certain timing
and payment stipulations]; (C) dwellings provided in whole or in part by
loans insured, guaranteed, or otherwise secured by the credit of the
Federal Government, [subject to certain payment, timing, and institution
stipulations]; and (D) dwellings provided by the development or the
redevelopment of real property purchased, rented, or otherwise obtained
from a State or local public agency receiving Federal financial assistance
for slum clearance or urban renewal with respect to such real property
under loan or grant contracts entered into after November 20, 1962.
42 U.S.C. § 3603(a)(1)(A)-(D) (2012). Certain dwellings are exempt from the
application of Section 3604. See id. § 3603(b).
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proscriptions are the negative obligations of the FHA.35  It is
unlawful under the FHA to refuse to rent or sell, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, a dwelling to a person because of
race. " The FHA also protects against discrimination in terms and
conditions of sale or rental. 7 The FHA prohibits advertising
expressing racial preference or disfavor 8 and misrepresenting the
availability of a unit.3  Finally, one may not, "[flor
profit... induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent
any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective
entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular
,,40
race ....
Furthermore, the FHA establishes liability for practices not
motivated by race-if discriminatory in effect, the practice violates
the FHA.41 "A practice has a discriminatory effect where it
actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a
group ... or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates
segregated housing patterns because of race .... ,42 If "legally
sufficient justification"43 is adequately shown, a discriminatory
effect is permissible.44 However, no "sufficient legal justification"
defense exists against claims of intentional discrimination.
45
As the law surrounding the FHA developed, it became clear
that affirmatively furthering fair housing requires more than
proscribing discrimination.46  Because the FHA contains the
35. Id. § 3603(a). It is important to note that although the FHA enumerates
the protected classes it seeks to protect and that each of these classes enjoys
protection, this Note concentrates on race.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
37. Id. § 3604(b).
38. Id. § 3604(c).
39. Id. § 3604(d).
40. Id. § 3604(e).
41. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013). This "negative obligation" closely relates to the
positive obligation to integrate.
42. Id. § 100.500(a) (emphasis added).
43. Id. § 100.500(b) ("(1) A legally sufficient justification exists where the
challenged practice: (i) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. [§1 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42
U.S.C. [§§] 3613 or 3614; and (ii) Those interests could not be served by another
practice that has a less discriminatory effect. (2) A legally sufficient justification
must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative.").
44. Id. § 100.500(c).
45. Id. § 100.500(d).
46. There are countless cases discussing violations of the obligation not to
discriminate. See, e.g., McDonald v. Coldwell Banker, 543 F.3d 498 (9th Cir. 2008);
Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 419 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988); Robinson v. 12
[Vol. 33: 285
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positive obligation to further fair housing, actions can violate the
FHA even if unmotivated by discrimination.47 An analysis of this
positive obligation is central to an evaluation of QAP, eventual
development placement, and these developments' costs.
2. An Affirmative Obligation to Integrate Under the Fair
Housing Act
The United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") is responsible for regulating the site and
neighborhood standards of public housing projects.48 In 1968,
Congress charged HUD with the authority to implement programs
and activities in a manner that affirmatively furthers fair
housing." Case law developed two important clarifications
surrounding the positive obligation: (1) housing authorities must
consider racial concentration before siting projects because (2)
racial integration is a long-term, community-wide responsibility.
50
Courts quickly interpreted the "affirmatively to further"
mandate as one that required consideration of a community's
racial composition. 1 In Shannon v. United States Department of
Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1036-37 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Hylton,
944 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188 (D. Conn. 2013); Boykin v. Gray, 895 F. Supp. 2d 199, 218
(D.D.C. 2012). For a discussion on how poor public policy choices compounded
segregation and made segregation the norm in the United States, see Sheryll D.
Cashin, Civil Rights in the New Decade: The Geography of Opportunity, 31 CUMB.
L. REV. 467, 469 (2001) (asserting that "racial and socio-economic segregation, as
opposed to integration, is now entrenched as the seemingly natural order").
However for purposes of this Note, focus is on the affirmative obligation to
integrate.
47. See, e.g., Hallmark Devs., Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 466 F.3d 1276, 1283
(11th Cir. 2006) (citing Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 804(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a))
(finding that "circumstantial evidence must often be used to establish the requisite
intent. Among the factors that are instructive ... are discriminatory or segregative
effect, historical background, the sequence of events leading up to the challenged
actions, and whether there were any departures from normal or substantive
criteria") (citing United States v. Hous. Auth. of City of Chickasaw, 504 F. Supp.
716, 727 (S.D. Ala. 1980)); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844
F.2d 926, 938 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding "[the] refusal to amend the restrictive zoning
ordinance to permit privately-built multi-family housing outside the urban renewal
area significantly perpetuated segregation in the Town"); Davis v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 685 F. 2d 838, 846 (N.D. Ill. 2010) affd sub nom, Estate of Davis v. Wells
Fargo Bank, 633 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding plaintiffs could not make a
showing of "a disproportionate effect on minority neighborhoods"); Jackson v. City
of Auburn, Ala., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1310 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (finding plaintiffs
failed to establish disparate enforcement of zoning ordinances).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2012).
49. Id. § 3608(d).
50. See Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Shannon v.
U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
51. Shannon, 436 F.2d at 809.
2015]
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Housing and Urban Development, the Third Circuit held that
placement of affordable housing in racially segregated areas or re-
segregating areas constituted a prima facie violation of the FHA.
5 2
Plaintiffs in Shannon contended that the planned HUD-funded
project failed to consider racial composition, thereby threatening
to increase racial and economic segregation in the area.53  The
court held the FHA, read together with other acts, demonstrated
''a progression in the thinking of Congress as to what factors
significantly contributed to urban blight and what steps must be
taken to reverse the trend or to prevent the recurrence of such
blight.5 4 Shannon most notably acknowledged that the FHA not
only prohibits discrimination based on race, but also grants HUD
responsibility to take affirmative steps to prevent segregation,
including an evaluation of the proposed siting's racial
composition.5 5  "Housing practices unlawful under Title VIII
include not only those motivated by a racially discriminatory
purpose, but also those that disproportionately affect minorities.
56
Furthermore, if the effect of a siting is re-segregation or
continued segregation the housing authority must build the units
elsewhere even though the siting may benefit some racial
minorities. 7 Such was the holding of Otero v. New York City
Housing Authority decided by the Second Circuit5 l8 three years
after Shannon.9 Otero held that the "purpose of racial integration
is to benefit the community ... not just certain of its members. ' ' "°
An increase or maintenance of segregative housing patterns may
immediately benefit a minority group. 1 But the affirmative duty
52. Id. at 820.
53. Id. at 812.
54. Id. at 816.
55. Id.
56. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988).
57. See Otero v. N.Y.C Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1134.
61. In Otero, New York City Housing Authority ("Authority") conducted an
urban renewal project that required residents to leave the area during the
revitalization process. Id. at 1125-26. The Authority failed to adhere to its
promise to give former residents, many of whom were non-White, first priority to
reside in the new public housing project. Id. The Authority contended its
adherence would "create a non-white 'pocket ghetto' that would operate as a racial
'tipping factor' causing white residents to take flight and leading eventually to non-
white ghettoization of the community." Id. at 1124. Otero held, agreeing with the
Authority, that integration requires not just introduction of non-Whites into




to promote integrative housing is not to be set aside just because
racial minorities accept housing in segregated or re-segregating
communities.
There may be some instances in which a housing decision will
permissibly result in greater racial concentration because of
the overriding importance of other imperative factors in
furtherance of national housing goals. But Congress' desire in
providing fair housing throughout the United States was to
stem the spread of urban ghettos and to promote open,
integrated housing, even though the effect in some instances
might be to prevent some members of a racial minority from9 62
residing in publicly assisted housing in a particular location.
Otero prohibits shortsighted placements. 3 Similarly, in Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority, the Seventh Circuit held that
Chicago's public housing program must include the entire
metropolitan area, not just the city of Chicago. 4 "All of the
parties, the Government officials, the documentary evidence, the
sole expert and the decided cases agree that a suburban or
metropolitan area plan is the sine qua non of an effective
remedy.6 5  The positive obligation is a long term, far-reaching
goal.
The current HUD Code forbids the siting of new affordable
units in two circumstances-these prohibitions serve as
affirmative actions against segregation. First, HUD proscribes
siting in areas of minority concentration. 7 Second, it proscribes
siting in a racially mixed area if it will cause a significant increase
in the proportion of minorities to non-minorities. 8 According to
the Code, an exception exists, but only to the first proscription:
(3) The site for new construction shall not be located in an
area of minority concentration unless:
(i) There are already sufficient, comparable
opportunities outside areas of minority concentration for
housing minority families in the income range that is to
be served by the proposed project; or
(ii) The project is necessary to meet overriding housing
needs that cannot feasibly be met otherwise in that
62. Id. at 1134.
63. Id.
64. Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 938-39 (7th Cir. 1974) ("The
realities of 'White flight' to the suburbs and the inevitability of 'resegregation' by
rebuilding the ghettos as [Chicago Housing Authority] and HUD were doing in
Chicago must therefore be considered in drawing a comprehensive plan.").
65. Id.
66. NAACP v. Sec'y ofHous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987).
67. 24 C.F.R. § 905.602(d)(3) (2014).
68. Id. § 905.602(d)(4) (2014).
2015]
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housing market area. 'Overriding housing needs' shall
not serve as the basis for determining that a site is
acceptable if the only reason that these needs cannot
otherwise feasibly be met is that, due to discrimination
because of race, color, religion, creed, sex, disability,
familial status, or national origin, sites outside areas of
minority concentration are unavailable.
(4) The site for new construction shall not be located in a
racially mixed area if the project will cause a significant
increase in the proportion of minority to nonminority residents
in the area.9
The current Code reflects case law developments and clearly
prohibits siting in areas of minority concentration or in areas in
danger of re-segregating.0 The LIHTC program and the federally-
mandated QAP work together to further the affirmative obligation
to integrate.
B. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program and the
Qualified Allocation Plan
To incentivize private developers to build affordable housing
developments, Congress created the LIHTC program under the
Tax Reform Act of 1968.71 The LIHTC is the largest U.S. program
providing property-based subsidies to rental housing.2  The
program provides developers with credits, which in turn, sell the
credits to raise either capital or equity for projects." Because a
developer does not have to borrow funds, its debt is lower, and
consequently, prospective tenants pay lower rents.4 A compliant
LIHTC program property can receive a dollar-for-dollar credit
against its federal tax liability each year up to the period during
69. Id. § 905.602(d)(3)-(4) (2014).
70. Id.
71. I.R.C. § 42 (2013).
72. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV. SUBMITTED BY ABT ASSOCIATES INC. IN
PARTNERSHIP WITH VIVA CONSULTING, WHAT HAPPENS TO LOW-INCOME HOUSING
TAX CREDIT PROPERTIES AT YEAR 15 AND BEYOND? 2 (2012), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/what happenslihtc.pdf (stating that in
recent years, it is estimated that LIHTC produced approximately 100,000 units).
However, other examples of potential funding include HOME Funds and funding
from the Community Development Block Grant ("CDBG") program. See, e.g.,
Funds Available, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hud
portal/HUD?src=/program offices/administration/grants/fundsavail (last visited
Nov. 30, 2013).
73. How Do Housing Tax Credits Work?, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program-offices/comm-planning/afforda





which the units must remain affordable, up to fifteen-years.75 The
IRS annually allocates LIHTC to state agencies, and ultimately,
state agencies allocate LIHTC to developers.6
Because each state's LIHTC are limited each year, allocation
of the credits is both strategic and competitive. In order to utilize
LIHTC, a state must have a QAP.8 The QAP awards credits (or
points) that ultimately determine how and where to allocate
LIHTC. Therefore, because a state can draft its QAP in such a
way as to further its specific housing goals by targeting
development placement in certain locations, it wields a significant
amount of freedom to effectuate its preferences.0 For example,
Minnesota Housing awards points in varying amounts for
rehabilitating an existing structure, utilizing existing sewer and
water lines, siting in higher income communities close to jobs, and
for "financial readiness to proceed." 1  And although an agency
awards points in varying amounts for its various selection
priorities, a housing authority can inappropriately allocate
LIHTC. 2 A recent case in Texas demonstrates that QAP creating
a disparate impact fail to meet FHA's positive obligations. 3
1. Texas Housing Tax Credit Program and the Fair
Housing Decision
The Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs
("TDHCA") developed a QAP to administer its LIHTC funds." In
2010, Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. ("ICP"), a Dallas-based
non-profit housing organization, alleged TDHCA perpetuated
75. Id; 42 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(d) (2013).
76. Allocating Housing Tax Credits, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program-offices/comm-planning/afforda
blehousing/training/web/lihtcbasics/allocating (last visited Oct. 19, 2013)
[hereinafter Allocating LIHTC].
77. Id. For example, in 2007, New Jersey developers applied for nearly $50
million in LIHTC, while the state's allotted credits totaled under $20 million.
Long, supra note 13, at 83.
78. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m) (2013).
79. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 462A.222 (2013). See infra Part III for an in-depth
discussion of Minneapolis and St. Paul's Qualified Allocation Plan.
80. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(m) (2013).
81. Self-Scoring Worksheet, 2013 Housing Tax Credit Program, supra note 17.
82. See generally Inclusive Cmtys. 11, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D. Tex. 2012);
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs (Inclusive
Cmtys. I), 749 F. Supp. 2d 486 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
83. Inclusive Cmtys. 11, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 312; Inclusive Cmtys. I, 749 F. Supp.
2d at 486.
84. Inclusive Cmtys. I, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
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segregation and discrimination through its LIHTC allocations. 5
ICP alleged TDHCA "disproportionately approved tax credits for
low-income housing in minority neighborhoods and ha[d] denied
applications for non-elderly low-income housing in predominately
Caucasian neighborhoods."8  ICP contended TDHCA's actions
violated not only Sections 3604(a)7 and 3605(a)" of the FHA, but
also the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and 42
U.S.C. § 1982.9 The parties cross-motioned for summary
judgment.9 0
The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of ICP
on the FHA claim."1  ICP provided evidence TDHCA
disproportionately approved applications for LIHTC credits in
minority neighborhoods, which caused a disparate racial impact.
2
The court found that ICP established its prima facie case of
discriminatory impact for its FHA claim. Therefore, the burden
shifted to TDHCA to show that its actions were "in furtherance of
a compelling government interest," that the interest was "bona
fide and legitimate," and there were "no less discriminatory
alternatives.9 4  TDHCA argued that its placements were
legitimate:
85. Id. at 493.
86. Id. (alleging that "92% percent [sic] of all LIHTC units in the city of Dallas
are in census tracts where more than one-half of the population is minority; that
TDHCA has discretion in determining which proposed projects receive tax credits,
and that TDHCA improperly takes race into account (both of the neighborhood and
potential residents), perpetuating racial segregation in Dallas housing").
87. [I]t shall be unlawful-(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
88.It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business
includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to
discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or
in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (2012).
89. Actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
90. Inclusive Cmtys. 11, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 493 (N.D. Tex. 2012). Specifically,
iCP contended the following: (1) TDHCA's making housing and financial assistance
unavailable because of race violated the FHA, and (2) TDHCA violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by using race as a factor in LIHTC allocations, actionable
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982-83.
91. Id. at 507. An action under the FHA may proceed under either a theory of
disparate treatment or disparate impact. See NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844
F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988), affd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
92. Inclusive Cmtys. I, 749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 500 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
93. Id. at 504.
94. Id. at 503.
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[T]he concentration of LIHTC developments in the inner-
areas serves a compelling government interest; that 26 U.S.C.
§ 42, the statute that establishes the low-income housing tax
credits, compels [TDHCA] to locate developments in the most
impoverished areas; that it is impossible for defendants to
comply with § 42 and achieve ICP's request that 50% of
LIHTC developments be located in the suburbs; and that to
the extent they conflict, § 42 controls over the FHA and §
1982. 9
The court held that TDHCA failed to establish that it could not
comply with Section 42 in a less discriminatory way,96 and
therefore denied TDHCA's motion for summary judgment on the
FHA claims.97  "[Clourts have held that actions that cause
disproportionate harm to African-Americans and produce a
segregative impact on the entire community create a strong prima
facie case [of discrimination under the FHA]."98
ICP also alleged that TDHCA violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by intentionally classifying
according to race.99 However, the court noted that under the Equal
Protection Clause, discriminatory effect alone is not sufficient-
rather, while discriminatory effect is not irrelevant, ICP needed to
demonstrate discriminatory intent.0 0 The court found that ICP
presented enough evidence, both circumstantial and direct,
showing TDHCA discriminated on the basis of race."' The court
also found that the ICP established its prima facie case of
discriminatory effect, thereby shifting the burden to the TDHCA
to "articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their
actions. 0 2  TDHCA argued that 26 U.S.C. § 42 specifically
encourages placements in impoverished neighborhoods and that
these neighborhoods are minority-concentrated. 3  Because
TDHCA produced a non-discriminatory reason for its action, the
95. Id.
96. Id. at 504.
97. Id. at 504.
98. Id. at 500.
99. Id. at 501.
100. Id.; See also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977) ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.").
101. Inclusive Cmtys. I, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 502 (stating that ICP presented
statistical and comparative evidence, evidence of a suspect sequence of events, that
the TDHCA employed a subjective decision-making process, and contemporary
statements by TDHCA officials indicating that race influenced its actions).
102. Id. at 504.
103. Id. at 505.
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burden shifted back to ICP. °4 The court denied TDHCA's motion
for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact
existed.
1 5
Therefore, in 2010, the court held ICP was entitled to partial
summary judgment by establishing the prima facie case's
components of its FHA and Fourteenth Amendment claims.0 6 The
parties presented their case in a bench trial to determine whether
TDHCA either intentionally discriminated on the basis of race in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
and the Property Rights of Citizens' statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, or
whether TDHCA's LIHTC allocations had a disparate racial
impact and, thus, violated Sections 3604(a) and 3605(a) of the
FHA. °7 The court held ICP failed to prove TDHCA intentionally
discriminated on the basis of race when allocating LIHTC, and
therefore, ICP failed to prove intentional discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment."' However, ICP established its FHA
discriminatory impact claim.09
Because ICP made a prima facie showing of disparate impact,
the burden shifted.1 0 Consequently, TDHCA now needed to show,
by a preponderance of evidence, its actions furthered a legitimate
government interest.1 Thus, TDHCA had to prove two elements:
(1) that its interest was both bona fide and legitimate and (2) no
less discriminatory means were available.1 2 The housing agency
offered that it had legitimate governmental interests, namely
complying with state and federal laws.1 The court assumed the
proffered interests were bona fide and legitimate, but TDHCA
argued neither that alternative means were unavailable nor that a
non-discriminatory allocation plan would hinder its interests. In
Texas, housing authorities used the prominent LIHTC program,
104. Id.
105. Id. at 507.
106. Id.
107. Inclusive Cmtys. 11, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 332 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
108. Id. at 321.
109. Id. at 332.
110. Id. at 322. "In particular, the court relied on evidence that, 'from 1999-
2008, TDHCA approved tax credits for 49.7% of proposed non-elderly units in 0% to
9.9% Caucasian areas, but only approved 37.4% of proposed non-elderly units in
90% to 100% Caucasian areas."' Id. (quoting Inclusive Cmtys. I, 749 F. Supp. 2d at
499).
111. Inclusive Cmtys. 11, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (citing NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988)).
112. Inclusive Cmtys. 11, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.
113. Id. at 323.
114. Id. at 326.
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which has the potential to integrate and promote development in
115
minority-concentrated areas .
C. "Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing"
The Fair Housing Act has proven less effective than
desired.1 As Professor john a. powell noted:
[T]he Fair Housing Act itself, and the anti-discrimination
orientation that it conveys, is part and parcel of the problem.
The Act itself was largely symbolic ... The orientation of the
Act itself may be an obstacle to fulfilling its vision of fair
housing .... [The Act's] provisions may increase the freedom
of choice for homebuyers, but have not necessarily helped
produce integrated neighborhoods or addressed segregated
living patterns. 117
Despite the growth in homeownership among persons of color,
African Americans remain highly segregated, particularly in
urban areas.118 Estimates in 2000 suggested a staggering 65% of
African Americans living in metropolitan areas would have to
relocate to accomplish full integration.11"9
To combat the FHA's shortcomings, HUD proposed a new
rule on July 19, 2013 to provide a more effective means to further
the FHA, namely Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing
("AFFH").12' The new rule lacks specifics beyond requiring that
HUD gather nationwide data, which participants can use as a
starting point to improve their communities. 121  HUD and its
participants base the analysis on four goals.
12 2
115. Id. at 327 n.23.
116. See john a. powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair
Housing Act at 40, 41 IND. L. REV. 605, 606 (2008). See AFFH, supra note 20, at
43710-11.
117. powell, supra note 116, at 606 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 608.
119. Id. at 608-09.
120. AFFH, supra note 20, at 43710.
121. Id. at 43711 ("The proposed rule does not mandate specific outcomes for the
planning process. Instead, recognizing the importance of local decision-making, it
establishes basic parameters and helps guide public sector housing and community
development planning and investment decisions to fulfill their obligation to
affirmatively further fair housing.").
122. Id. ("[T]he rule seeks to make program participants more empowered to
foster the diversity and strength of communities and regions by [1] improving
integrated living patterns and overcoming historic patterns of segregation, [2]
reducing racial and ethnic concentrations of poverty, and [3] responding to
identified disproportionate housing needs of persons protected by the Fair Housing
Act ... [and] [4] reducing disparities in access to key community assets based on
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability .... ").
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As QAPs go unchallenged, communities remain entrenched
in segregation. 123 Areas in danger of re-segregating are tipping
towards minority-concentration. 124 The Twin Cities Metropolitan
Area exemplifies this reality-the LIHTC, despite its integrative
intentions, suffers from a QAP that affirmatively furthers
segregative and expensive housing developments. Numerous
similarities exist between Inclusive Communities I and II and the
Twin Cities QAP regarding the segregative use of LIHTC, but in
addition, the Twin Cities used their QAP to build expensive units
based improperly on community improvement.
III. Analysis: The Problematic QAP in the Twin Cities
Before discussing the problems embedded in the Twin Cities
QAP, this Analysis outlines Minneapolis and St. Paul QAP basics.
The Analysis then discusses two problems with the QAP: (1) it
favors placements in minority-concentrated areas, and (2) it allows
siting segregative placements in a costly manner through
community improvement efforts. While the former problem finds
its roots in the drafting of the Twin Cities QAP itself, the costs
associated with these non-integrative developments further violate
FHA obligations by allowing community development regimes to
replace integrative obligations. The Analysis concludes by
applying lessons from the recent Inclusive Communities II decision
to the problems facing the Twin Cities.
A. The Current Twin Cities QAP
Section 42(m) of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") requires
that the Twin Cities' housing tax credit agencies develop and
adopt a qualified allocation plan. The Twin Cities QAP, like
other QAPs, sets forth the selection criteria used in determining
housing priorities, particularly by giving priorities and preferences
"as a condition to allocating Low Income Housing Tax
Credits ... to housing projects. 1 2'  The QAP gives preference in
allocating LIHTC to the following:
(1) projects serving the lowest income tenants;
(2) projects contractually obligated to serve qualified tenants
for the longest periods; and
123. Long, supra note 13, at 83.
124. Id. at 91. (citing Shannon v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d
809, 812 (3d Cir. 1970)).
125. Twin Cities QAP, supra note 22.
126. Id. at art. I.
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(3) projects located in a Qualified Census Tract 127 that are




Under Section 42(m)(1)(C) of the Code, allocating LIHTC
requires the examination of certain factors within the selection
criteria for housing projects.1 29  The Twin Cities QAP incorporates
eight criteria from the Code.3 The QAP also sets forth selection
criteria for determining housing priorities appropriate to local
conditions and provides a procedure for monitoring compliance.131
The Twin Cities QAP explicitly discusses the FHA. It notes
that participants must use affirmative fair housing marketing
practices in "soliciting renters, determining eligibility, and
concluding all transactions as addressed in Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. '13 The QAP then outlines what is unlawful,
namely the FHA's negative obligations not to discriminate.1
The Minneapolis/Saint Paul Housing Finance Board
("Board")3  allocates the LIHTC available in Minnesota.1 5  The
127. Defined as follows:
(I) The term 'qualified census tract' means any census tract ... designated
by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development... in which 50
percent or more of the households have an income which is less than 60
percent of the area median gross income for such year or which has a
poverty rate of at least 25 percent .... (II) The portion of a metropolitan
statistical area which may be designated for purposes of this
subparagraph shall not exceed an area having 20 percent of the population
of such metropolitan statistical area. (III) For purposes of this clause,
each metropolitan statistical area shall be treated as a separate area and
all nonmetropolitan areas in a State shall be treated as 1 area.
26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(ii) (2013).
128. Twin Cities QAP, supra note 22, at art. I1(A).
129. Id. at art. 111(B).
130. Id. ("(1) project location; (2) housing needs characteristics; (3) project
characteristics; (4) sponsor characteristics; (5) tenant populations with special
housing needs; (6) public housing waiting lists; (7) tenant populations of
individuals with children; and (8) projects intended for eventual tenant
ownership.").
131. Id. at art. 111(D)-(E). See Minneapolis/Saint Paul Housing Finance Board,
2015 Housing Tax Credit Program Procedural Manual, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL
Hous. FIN. BD., http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public@cped/documen
ts/webcontent/wcmslp-108463.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).
132. Id. at art. VI(H).
133. Id.
134. MINN. STAT. § 462A.221 subd. 1(a) (2013).
135. The 2014 estimate LIHTC amounts are $1,376,364 for Minneapolis and
$1,025,857 for St. Paul. Minneapolis/Saint Paul Housing Finance Board, 2014 Low
Income Housing Tax Credit Procedural Manual, MINNEAPOLIS/SAINT PAUL Hous.
FIN. BD., http://www.stpaul.gov/DocumentCenter/View/65561 (last visited Sept. 30,
2013).
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Board annually awards LIHTC through two competition rounds.136
"First round" allocation procedure entails not only timely
submission, but also certain threshold requirements.137
Metropolitan area projects must consist of new construction or
substantial rehabilitation for (1) projects in which at least 75% of
LIHTC units are single-room occupancy, efficiency, or one bedroom
and are affordable by households whose income does not exceed
30% of the median income; (2) projects not restricted to persons
fifty-five years of age or older, at least 75% of LIHTC units contain
two or more bedrooms, one-third of that 75% must contain three or
more bedrooms; or (3) simply substantial rehabilitation of projects
the city targets for revitalization."' If the metropolitan area
project meets the threshold requirement, the Board then rates the
project according to its preference priority point system, outlined
in Article IX of the QAP.1 9 Priority points are awarded for
favorable development characteristics described in LIHTC
applications. The Twin Cities QAP rates those projects receiving
the most points first, and therefore, these projects receive LIHTC
allocations.
B. The Twin Cities QAP Is Both Segregative and Costly
The Twin Cities QAP does not mention the affirmative
obligation to build integrative developments. Saint Paul awards a
maximum of 237 priority points, their nature means nearly 200
points are in favor of central city developers. 40 For example, the
QAP awards the most points to the projects with the following
characteristics:
- provides support services for homeless occupants;
- provides housing for the mentally ill, the developmentally
disabled, those with drug dependencies, those with brain
injuries, the physically disabled, or those with HIV/AIDS-
related illness;
- provides resident support services;
136. MINN. STAT. § 462A.222 subd. 3(a) (2013).
137. Twin Cities QAP, supra note 22, at art. VIII.
138. MINN. STAT. § 462A.222 subd. 3(d)(1)(i)-(iii). The statute also permits first-
round applicants outside the metropolitan area, those rented to persons with
serious and persistent mental illness, developmental disabilities, drug
dependencies, brain injuries, or physical disabilities to certain requirements.
MINN. STAT. § 462A.222, subd. 3(d)(2)-(3).
139. Twin Cities QAP, supra note 22, at art. VIII.
140. Saint Paul's Self Scoring Worksheet for Selection Points (2014),
MINNEAPOLIS/SAINT PAUL Hous. FIN. BD., http://www.stpaul.gov/DocumentCenter
Niew/65566 (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
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- a developer with a recommendation of support from a city
recognized citizen participation community planning
council;
- sites in "Neighborhood Stabilization Program"
neighborhoods;
- preserves subsidized low-income housing;
- rehabilitates of existing buildings;
- utilizes other project-based funding sources;
- attracts private financing;
- sites within 0.25 miles of transit stops;
- develops with a high density of units;
- sites on Housing and Redevelopment Authority ("HRA")
owned land or on property which has outstanding
HRA/City debt obligations; and
- promotes walkability to various daily amenities.141
Minnesota Housing's self-scoring worksheet outlines many of the
same selection criteria, adding some criteria such as siting near
existing sewer and water lines, siting near higher income
communities close to jobs, and favoring projects which have
secured one or more other funding commitments.142
Awarding points in this manner benefits certain individuals
and maybe even larger groups. 3 However, the current and
proposed allocation scheme ignores the affirmative obligation to
build integrative developments, because the QAP awards LIHTC
credits to the central cities in a racially segregative manner.4
Unfortunately, Minneapolis and St. Paul actions bolster prior
concerns of segregative LIHTC allocations as the process awards
no points for developments near high-achieving schools or pro-
integrative developments.
141. Twin Cities QAP, supra note 22, at art. IX.
142. Self-Scoring Worksheet, 2013 Housing Tax Credit Program, supra note 17.
143. Allocating points for sites near higher income communities that have better
proximity to job opportunities can also translate into better school systems and
stronger tax bases. See Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community
Revitalization: Applying the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income Housing Tax
Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1759 (2005).
144. See Letter from Myron Orfield, Dir. of the Inst. on Metro. Opportunity, to
Libby Starling, Dir. of Research (on file with the Inst. on Metro. Opportunity)
[hereinafter Starling Letter].
145. See Long, supra note 13, at 76; Orfield, supra note 143, at 1759-60.
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1. Segregative Development Through the Twin Cities QAP
The Twin Cities QAP awards points in a segregative manner
as a vast majority of points are awarded in segregated or re-
segregating communities. According to the Institute on
Metropolitan Opportunity ("IMO"), in 2013 55% of all subsidized
units in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area were sited in
neighborhoods that were at least 29% non-White, though they
make up only 23% of total housing in that region.146 The poverty
rate in these neighborhoods is 23% compared to 6% in the rest of
the region.147  Saint Paul and Minneapolis show a stronger
disparity; while subsidized housing makes up 55% of all housing
units, 85% of those units were sited in at least 29% non-White
neighborhoods." 8  Funneling large percentages of affordable
housing in these areas rapidly increases minority concentration in
segregated neighborhoods, impedes minority presence in
predominantly White neighborhoods, and puts integrated
neighborhoods in danger of re-segregating.
In general, poor Blacks and Latinos residing in racially
segregated cities and inner suburbs attend "overwhelmingly low
income schools.1 50  Racial segregation shares deep ties to
intergenerational poverty, negative health consequences, and
other problems.1 5 1 According to Professor Myron Orfield:
Children who grow up in predominately poor neighborhoods
and attend very low income schools face many barriers to
academic and occupational achievement, even if they
themselves are not poor .... Concentrated poverty
neighborhoods have very high crime rates, often multiples of
the suburban violent crime rate, and huge health disparities
resulting from the concentration of environmental hazards,
stress, inadequate health care facilities, and poor quality,
expensive food.
15 2
Exposure to opportunity, instead of concentrated segregation and
poverty, fosters numerous benefits.153  If able to move to largely
White, opportunity-rich suburbs, women with low incomes
improve their employment and earnings, employment rates in




150. Orfield, supra note 143, at 1760 ("[P]oor whites, who do not face housing
discrimination and live more dispersed throughout suburbia, live in middle-income
neighborhoods and attend middle-class schools.").
151. Long, supra note 13, at 95.
152. Orfield, supra note 143, at 1760-61.
153. Id. at 1761-62.
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general increase, and children fare significantly better
academically in affluent suburban schools.1 4 Integration enables
long-term benefits; 155 desegregated elementary school attendees
are more likely to attend "a desegregated college, live in a
desegregated neighborhood, work in a desegregated environment,
and possess high career aspirations.1 56  A study of some of the
nation's most selective law schools showed that the vast majority
of the students had attended desegregated colleges. 1 7
As the Board continues to site affordable housing in a non-
integrative fashion, not only are neighborhoods affected but also
schools. The Twin Cities' subsidized housing exists largely near
segregated or re-segregating schools.
15 8
Sixty percent of the region's subsidized housing was located
near schools that were segregated (more than fifty percent
non-white) .... Another twenty-five percent was near schools
that were re-segregating (thirty to fifty percent of students
non-white). Only sixteen percent of the region's subsidized
housing was located by schools that were predominantly white
or stably integrated.
Currently, segregated schools serve a little over a quarter of the
region's students, while predominantly White schools serve 54% of
the region's students.6 0 LIHTC suburban participants sited 80%
of their units in White or integrated areas.1 1 In contrast, LIHTC
urban participants sited 86% of their units in "neighborhoods with
more than thirty percent minority" concentration and also "in
areas with predominantly non-white, high poverty, low performing
schools ."l2
Under HUD's current Code, housing authorities cannot
approve new affordable units in areas of minority concentration.1
In addition, housing authorities cannot approve new units in a
racially mixed area that will cause a significant increase in the
154. Id. at 1762 (noting this result manifested without job training and/or
placement services).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1761-63.
157. Id. at 1763.
158. Starling Letter, supra note 144 (categorizing, for school demographic
purposes, "predominantly white (schools with non-white shares between zero and
thirty percent), integrated (non-white shares between thirty and fifty percent), and





163. 24 C.F.R. § 905.602(d)(3) (2014).
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proportion of minorities to non-minorities.1 4  However, an
exception does exist which would allow developers to build in
areas of minority concentration-new construction may be built in
an area of minority concentration if "(i) [there are already
sufficient, comparable opportunities outside areas of minority
concentration for housing minority families in the income range
that is to be served by the proposed project; or (ii) [tihe project is
necessary to meet overriding housing needs that cannot feasibly be
met otherwise in that housing market area.
15
"Overriding needs" shall not serve as basis for determining
that a site is acceptable if the only reason that these needs cannot
otherwise feasibly be met is that, due to discrimination because of
race, color, religion, creed, sex, disability, familial status, or
national origin, sites are unavailable. No exceptions exist for
siting in areas in danger of re-segregating-the Code forbids
placements that will cause a significant increase in the proportion
of minorities to non-minorities. While Minneapolis and St. Paul
provide some information on recently built and planned affordable
housing developments, 7  neither city currently provides
information that would allow, under the exception, for these
continued placements.
Minneapolis and St. Paul's recent placements of affordable
housing violate the FHA and HUD siting regulations. First,
housing authorities must take racial composition of neighborhoods
into account before placing affordable developments. 8 Before
siting developments, all grantees of federal funds must carefully
analyze neighborhood demographics. 9 In Shannon, placement of
affordable housing in racially segregated or re-segregating
neighborhoods constituted a prima facie violation of the FHA.17 °
Statutorily, housing authorities may approve new affordable
developments in minority-concentrated areas if there are (i)
already sufficient and comparable opportunities outside these
areas or (ii) if overriding housing ends that cannot otherwise be
met make the placement necessary.7 Neither Minneapolis nor St.
Paul has brought forth evidence that the planned developments
164. Id. § 905.602(d)(4).
165. Id. § 905.602(d)(3).
166. Id. § 905.602(d)(4).
167. Orfield, supra note 143.
168. 24 C.F.R. § 905.602(d)(3)-(4) (2014).
169. See Shannon v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 813 (3d
Cir. 1970).
170. Id. at 820.
171. 24 C.F.R. § 905.602(d)(3)(i)-(ii) (2014).
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meet an exception. Well over three-quarters of all subsidized
units are in largely non-White areas.172  Rather than
demonstrating that sufficient and comparable housing
opportunities outside of minority-concentrated areas exist, the
data demonstrate that the current placements exist in high-crime,
low-educational opportunity areas.173 The current QAPs award no
points for racial integration, contrary to the analysis required by
Shannon..4 and the current Code. Second, the positive obligation
is a long term, long-range goal.1 5 Otero held that the "purpose of
racial integration is to benefit the community as a whole, not just
certain of its members." ' Furthermore, under the Mount Laurel
doctrine, metropolitan communities have an obligation to provide
for its "fair share" of a region's "existing and projected" need for
affordable housing."'
Minnesota Housing's 2014 to 2015 program proposes minor
changes to the amount of priority points awarded to certain
characteristics and to language, but largely focuses on community
development through economic integration, job growth, and
transportation.1 "8 The revisions to the tax credit program neither
address racial integration nor school integration transportation
costs, nor mention racial integration or school integration."
The cost of these segregative projects adds an additional
layer of concern. Based on the information provided by
Minneapolis and St. Paul, the QAP favor placements in areas of
minority concentration or those areas in danger of re-segregating,
where it costs more to develop, instead of placements in largely
White suburbs."' While project costs are not a proper
172. See Streams, HOUSINGLINK, http://www.housinglink.org/streams/. This
dynamic website permits the user to select a type of housing and view its
concentration in the Twin Cities Metropolitan Area. Selecting subsidized housing
shows a disproportionate amount of subsidized housing in the central cities area.
173. See id.
174. Shannon, 436 F.2d at 809.
175. See Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973).
176. Id.
177. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel H), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983); NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
178. 2014-2015 Housing Tax Credit Program, QAP and Procedural Manual
Proposed Revisions, MINN. Hous. FIN. AGENCY, http://www.mnhousing.gov/idc/
groups/nultifamily/documents/document/mhfa_013619.pdf (last visited Sept. 30,
2013) [hereinafter 2014-2015 Housing Tax Credit Program].
179. Id. Close proximity to transportation and jobs does not inherently benefit
individuals as "Ujobs in central cities for non-professionals are harder to come by
and pay less than jobs typically available in surrounding suburban communities."
Long, supra note 13, at 95.
180. See infra Part III(B)(2).
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consideration, any price-oriented arguments against building in
the suburbs are easily dismissed. Inner city developments are
expensive and, rather than integrating, aim toward community
development.181 Currently, the Twin Cities allocate LIHTC in a
manner suggesting that integration is subordinate to expensive
development efforts, which obfuscates the FHA's clear obligation
to integrate. 18 2 If AFFH enters into force, this legislation will
statutorily approve expensive-and segregative-developments
done in the name of community development."' This result runs
contrary to the FHA's basic obligation to integrate.
2. Costly Development Through the Twin Cities QAP
AFFH defines "fair housing choice" to mean that "individuals
and families have the information, options, and protection to live
where they choose without unlawful discrimination . .. "",4
According to AFFH, fair housing choice "encompasses actual
choice, which means the existence of realistic housing options;
protected choice, which means housing that can be accessed
without discrimination; and enabled choice, which means the
availability and realistic access to sufficient information regarding
options so that any choice is informed. 1 15 The proposed rule does
not include integration in its definition of fair housing choice."'
By omitting integration in the definition of fair housing choice, the
rule's current language allows communities to use community
improvement plans to fulfill FHA obligations.187
The FHA requires more than non-discrimination. Fair
housing choice also includes an obligation to integrate, and
therefore, providing non-discriminatory housing options alone
remains insufficient. Current QAPs, particularly that of the Twin
Cities area, although facially non-discriminatory, replace
integrative obligations with expensive housing choices; its QAP
makes no mention of the Act's affirmative obligation.
Although the FHA and Code require integrative
developments, the Twin Cities Board allows segregative










cheaper alternatives."' Some consider comparing projects' total
development cost per square foot ("TDC/SF") the best manner of
evaluating price differences. 9  Therefore, the following
calculations use a TDC/SF comparison.
The average TDC/SF in recent Dakota County suburban
developments equals approximately $117.9' Following requests
for affordable housing data from the central corridor, St. Paul and
Minneapolis provided housing information, found in Appendix 11192
and Appendix III,193 respectively. The average TDC/SF in St. Paul
equals roughly $278.4 This makes the TDC/SF approximately 2.5
times more expensive in St. Paul's central corridor than Dakota
County.19 5 A few of St. Paul's 2014 planned projects in this area
are, individually, closer to triple the TDC/SF of the average
Dakota County development.9  Minneapolis provided less
complete data; based off of the numbers provided, Minneapolis
developments have an average TDC/SF of $147, roughly 1.3 times
more expensive than Dakota County. 9
According to St. Paul's Department of Planning and
Economic Development, a proper comparison of inner city
developments to suburban counterparts takes into account the fact
that urban projects accumulate various added costs. Some
relevant, cost-increasing factors include:
- Some construction is not new construction, but rather,
adapter reuse of historic buildings. Historic adaptive
reuse is typically more expensive than new construction;
- In a fully developed city, all new housing developments are
on redeveloped sites. This means that something often
188. 2014-2015 Housing Tax Credit Program, supra note 178.
189. Email from Mark Ulfers, Exec. Dir., Dakota Cnty. Cmty. Dev. Agency, to
Myron Orfield, Dir., Inst. on Metro. Opportunity (on file with the Inst. on Metro.
Opportunity) [hereinafter Ulfers Email].
190. Dakota County is a predominantly White suburb south of Minneapolis and
St. Paul.
191. Ulfers Email, supra note 189. The Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity
provided a chart detailing each development's specifics in Dakota County produced
by the developer of the units. See infra Appendix I.
192. See infra Appendix II.
193. Email from Matt Goldstein, CPED Residential Fin., City of Minneapolis, to
author (July 17, 2013) (on file with author) (numbers calculated by the author)
[hereinafter Goldstein Email I]. See infra Appendix III.
194. See infra Appendix II.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Goldstein Email I, supra note 193.
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needs to be torn down first, which adds demolition costs
and environmental costs to the TDC;
- Urban sites can involve additional permitting costs that
allow for the temporary close of streets and sidewalks
during stages of the construction; and
- Housing in the central (transit) corridor often has
commercial space on the first floor, which further adds to
development cost.9
Different construction standards for commercial space to
residential space contribute to added costs. 19 Many central
corridor developments boast first-floor commercial space, which
adds to the total development cost.
It is possible to isolate commercial construction costs from
residential costs for affordable housing developments. 20 First, the
Minnesota Housing Finance Agency's ("MHFA") Multifamily
Workbook-pro forma 402 or HTC-1-has separate lines for
commercial construction costs; this is done to both help clarify
financial underwriting and to determine compliance with low-
income housing tax credit rules.01 Second, data worksheet project
summaries list commercial costs as "non-housing costs.
°20 2
For example, the non-housing costs for the Currie Lofts
project total $1,594,233 The residential TDC/SF is
approximately $121. If the developer builds the planned,
approximately 5000 square feet of commercial space, the cost per
square commercial foot will be about $319. Whether or not this is
the TDC/SF, or just construction cost per square foot, is unclear at
198. See infra Appendix II.
199. Id.
200. Until recently, neither city openly shared its affordable housing data via
request or made it easily available online. See Current Planning & Development
Activities, CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/cped/projects
/index.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
201. 2014-2015 Housing Tax Credit Program, supra note 178. See also
Minnesota Multifamily Rental Housing Common Application, MINN. Hous. FIN.
AGENCY, http://www.mnhousing.gov/wcs/Satellite?c=Page&cid=1358905251684&pa
gename=External%2FPage%2FEXTStandardLayout (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
The application can be downloaded for a breakdown of cost-reporting requirements.
Id.
202. Currie Park Lofts (Phase I) Worksheet, CPED MULTIFAMILY Hous. DEV.,
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@clerkldocuments/webcontent/
wcmslp-084461.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Currie Lofts
Worksheet]; Emanuel Housing Worksheet, CPED MULTIFAMILY HOuS. DEV.,
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@council/documents/webcontent
/convert 273566.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Emanuel Housing
Worksheet]; 2014-2015 Housing Tax Credit Program, supra note 178.
203. Currie Lofts Worksheet, supra note 202.
[Vol. 33: 285
FAIR HOUSING ACT
this time; however, this is roughly a 3:1 ratio, commercial to
residential. Even with these resources, determining how much
additional cost a mixed-use project possesses is troublesome.
Emanuel Housing, which purports to have 10,000 square feet of
commercial space, does not have any number listed under "non-
housing costs" on its worksheet.2 °4
Aurora St. Anthony Neighborhood Development Corporation
("ASANDC") provided the most thorough information on a mixed-
use development, outlined in Appendix IV.2 15 Frogtown's2 ° TDC is
approximately $9,737,646 for 61,800 square feet, including 15,000
square feet of private, underground parking. °7 This puts the
TDC/SF at approximately $157.21' The approximate TDC for the
retail space is $2,326,672 for the 11,700 square feet of commercial
space .29 Therefore, the TDC/SF for the development's commercial
space totals roughly $199.21" The TDC for the residential space is
roughly $7,410,973 and there is 50,100 square feet of this space.2
1
The TDC/SF equals $148. These numbers, though inconsistent
with the 3:1 ratio of Currie Lofts, nevertheless show that
commercial space costs more to develop than residential space and
demonstrate that central corridor developments are more
expensive, even without the commercial component.
Currently, mixed-use projects cost more to construct than
purely residential developments and first-floor commercial space
exists more prevalently in the central cities.1  However,
obligations of the FHA demand that affordable developments not
be built in areas of minority concentration or areas in danger of re-
segregating.2 4  Even if these units were less expensive
204. Emanuel Housing Worksheet, supra note 202.
205. Email from Nieeta Presley, Exec. Dir. of ASANDC, to author (Oct. 15, 2013)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Presley Email]. Appendix IV is on file with
author.
206. Frogtown is the colloquial name for the Thomas-Dale neighborhood in St.
Paul, Minnesota. See Frog Town or Thomas Dale, RAMSEY CNTY. HISTORICAL
SOC'Y, http://www.rchs.com/neighborhoods/frogtown.htm (last visited Sept. 24,
2014).






213. See infra Part III(B)(2).
214. See Presley Email, supra note 205.
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developmentally, this does not negate the affirmative obligation to
site affordable projects in the suburbs.215
Whether or not building in urban centers is more affordable,
the FHA's positive obligation requires siting in the predominantly
White suburbs to achieve racial integration.216  Community
development that is not defined to include integration is not
synonymous with integration. The argument that color-blind
placements217 further fair housing because they serve community
development is not only non-integrative, but also demonstrates the
shortsightedness prohibited under Otero.2 8  Even though some
racial minorities may benefit from housing in an area with first-
floor commercial space and other development efforts, if the effect
is that of re-segregation or continued segregation, the FHA
requires the development's siting elsewhere.2  A costly housing
development does not necessarily fulfill FHA obligations, even if
done under the prerogative of community improvement. Monetary
costs do not negate the integrative obligation, but rather, can
enhance the FHA's affirmative obligation.
At this time, the Twin Cities neither presents evidence of
costly suburban development nor explains why current central
corridor developments boasting commercial space further its
integrative obligations. Placing units in the suburbs both furthers
fair housing and does so in a less costly manner. Demographic
analysis must take place because the FHA prohibits siting in
racially mixed areas if the units will have a re-segregating effect.
22
1
Until Minneapolis and St. Paul can demonstrate that placements
in minority-concentrated areas fall under one of the statutory
exceptions-either that there are sufficient and comparable
opportunities or that there is an overriding housing need that
demands the placement22 -- new affordable developments cannot
be built in segregating or re-segregating areas, and the current
QAP does not fulfill its FHA positive obligation, even if done with
community development intentions.
215. Id.
216. See Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973).
217. See Shannon v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 809-10 (3d
Cir. 1970) (requiring that racial composition be taken into account before siting
developments).
218. Otero, 484 F.2d at 1134.
219. See id.
220. 24 C.F.R. § 905.602(d)(4) (2014).
221. Id. § 905.602(d)(3)(i)-(ii) (2014).
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C. Lessons from Other Jurisdictions: Violations and Steps
in the Right Direction
In Inclusive Communities II, the court found a disparate
impact violation of the FHA when TDHCA disproportionately
approved tax credits for low-income housing in minority
neighborhoods.222 ICP argued TDHCA approved roughly 50% of
non-elderly affordable units in predominately non-White areas,
but failed to approve nearly 40% of these same units in
predominantly White areas.2 3  ICP alleged TDHCA
disproportionately approved LIHTC in minority neighborhoods,
and after analyzing TDHCA's data, discovered that nearly 95% of
Dallas' LIHTC sited units in areas less than 50% Caucasian.2 24 A
Texas House Committee on Urban Affairs report found that the
QAP "disproportionately allocate [s] federal low income housing tax
credit funds ... to developments located in [areas with above
average minority concentrations]. 2  Similarly, the Twin Cities
QAP enables placements in minority concentrated areas and sites
LIHTC units in these areas.
TDHCA, like the Twin Cities Board, exercises discretion in
determining which projects will receive LIHTC by drafting its
QAP.2 27  The court found that TDHCA failed to argue that
alternative means were unavailable or, in the alternative, that a
non-discriminatory plan hindered its interest in complying with
state and federal law. 2 '8  Like Inclusive Communities II, a
challenge to the Twin Cities' placements under the FHA likely
requires a showing that a disproportionate harm to minorities
exists.9  If challengers to the Twin Cities QAP demonstrate a
prima facie showing of disparate impact, the burden shifts back to
the Board to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the QAP's
legitimacy and that no less discriminatory means are available.
2
11
222. Inclusive Cmtys. 11, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 332 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
223. Inclusive Cmtys. I, 749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 499 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
224. Id. at 493.
225. Id. at 500 ("[Als of 2006, 77% of LIHTC units in the city of Dallas were in
above-average minority areas, leading to 'concentration problems.' A study by the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ('HUD') reached a similar
conclusion (reporting that, from 1995-2006, 67% of LIHTC units in Texas were in
greater than 50% minority areas, as opposed to 47% of all units; similarly, 69% of
all LIHTC units in the city of Dallas were in greater than 50% minority areas, as
opposed to 45% of all units.)") (citations omitted).
226. Streams, supra note 172.
227. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(m) (2013).
228. Inclusive Cmtys. 11, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 332 (N.D. Tex. 2012).
229. Inclusive Cmtys. I, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 499.
230. See Inclusive Cmtys. 11, 860 F. Supp 2d at 322-23.
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Following the 2012 holding in Inclusive Communities II,
Texas revised its QAP presumptively to meet its FHA obligations
to site integrative affordable developments. 231 Texas' current QAP
better addresses the FHA's positive obligation, specifically through
its "Housing De-Concentration Factors" ("Factors").232  Under the
Housing De-Concentration Factors, the Texas Board cannot make
a LIHTC award to projects in "a county with a population that
exceeds one million if the proposed Development Site is also
located less than two linear miles from the proposed Development
Site of another Application within said county that is awarded in
the same calendar year. '3  The Factors forbid a later
development's placement in the same mile as a pre-existing
development if the developments receive awards within three
years of one another. Instead of allowing LIHTC allocations to
group together in minority concentrated areas or areas in danger
of re-segregating, the Texas QAP makes de-
concentration/integration a threshold issue.
Only after an applicant meets the Texas de-concentration
requirement does the QAP award any priority points. The Texas
QAP awards points for placements near succeeding schools and
examines the average income of the neighborhood. 23' A proposed
development in the top quartile of median household income and
in the attendance zone of a high performing school receives the
greatest number of points.2 7  As the median household income
231. See TDHCA Board Approved Draft of the Qualified Allocation Plan, DEP'T
OF Hous. & CMTY. AFFAIRS, TDHCA Gov. BD., http://www.tdhca.state.tx.us
/multifamily/docs/14-DraftQAP.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter Texas
2014 QAP].
232. Id.
233. Id. § 11.3(a). Texas' 2008 QAP did not contain housing de-concentration
factors. Instead, de-concentration-wise, the 2008 QAP only forbade two placements
within one linear mile in the same calendar year. See 2008 Housing Tax Credit
Program Qualified Allocation Plan and Rules, TEX. DEP'T OF HOUS. & CMTY.
AFFAIRS, http://www.tdhca.state.tx.us/multifamily/housing-tax-credits-9pctldocs/08-
QAP.pdf [hereinafter Texas 2008 QAP].
234. Texas 2014 QAP, supra note 231. In order to be ineligible, the proposed
development must serve the same type of household as the existing development,
the existing development must have received funds at any time during the three-
year period preceding the date of the proposed development's application, and the
existing development must not have been terminated from the LIHTC program.
Id. § 11.3(c).
235. See id. § 11.2.
236. Id. § 11.9(c)(4)(A)(i)-(iv).
237. Id. § 11.9(c)(4)(A)(i). In 2008, the QAP awarded only four points for units
proposed in either an economically distressed area, an area receiving an award
within the past three years from Texas' Agricultural Finance Program or Real
Estate Development Program, an area with a higher median income than the
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decreases and level of school performance decreases, or one
characteristic exists without the other, the number of points
awarded drops.23s The QAP awards additional points for
educational excellence.2 9  The Texas QAP also gives priority points
for total development costs. 4 ° The QAP explicitly addresses the
"efficient use of limited resources and applicant accountability. 2 41
As the building costs become more expensive, the QAP awards
fewer points.
A QAP that creates balanced and integrative living patterns
takes race into account and sites affordable developments to
produce long-term, community-wide benefits. But rather than
litigate, Minneapolis and St. Paul can take affirmative steps to
revise the current QAP.24 ' The FHA requires housing authorities
to use their leverage to not only avoid discriminatory actions, but
also affirmatively take steps to integrate. Affirmative steps
must embody long-term, race-conscious efforts. The Twin Cities
have the statutory authority to meet this positive obligation and
not exchange it for segregative projects obscured as community
improvement.2 4 5
IV. Conclusion
Segregation is alive and well in the United States and not
simply due to overt discrimination. The federally-mandated QAP
gives each LIHTC participant the ability to draft a QAP that best
serves its particularized affordable housing needs. A poorly
drafted QAP can become segregative in effect, which costs
communities not only socially but also monetarily. The FHA
requires integration regardless of cost, and community
median income for the county, an area within the elementary school attendance
zone of an "Exemplary" or "Recognized" elementary school, or an area that will
expand affordable housing opportunities for low-income families with children
outside of poverty areas. Texas 2008 QAP, supra note 233, at § 50(9)(i)(16)(A)-(E).
However, once the QAP awards points in geographic category (A) through (E), the
development becomes ineligible for four points in other areas. Id. Therefore, if
planned in an economically distressed area, the proposed unit receives four points
and has no further incentives to geographically site in areas with higher median
incomes or exemplary schools. See id.
238. Texas 2014 QAP, supra note 231, at § 11.9(c)(4)(A)(i)-(iv).
239. Id. § 11.9(c)(5).
240. Id. § 11.9(e).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 11.9(e)(2).
243. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m) (2013).
244. See supra Part II(A)(2).
245. Id.
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development does not necessarily constitute integration. At this
time, the Twin Cities can build affordable developments in a more
inexpensive fashion in the predominantly White suburbs, but its
QAP favors expensive, non-integrative developments.
As this Note shows, a poorly drafted QAP can become a tool
for segregative, costly development. The Twin Cities serve to
demonstrate this reality. Cost alone should not be the sole
motivating factor for remedying the non-integrative Twin Cities
QAP-on the contrary, societal costs and the failed obligations
under the FHA should serve as the primary bases for reform. But
high monetary costs further demonstrate that affordable housing
development under the FHA, when left unmonitored, become
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